ZWeR 2023, 368
American Merger Enforcement: A Progress Report on The Biden’s Administration’s Agenda
Contents
- I. Introduction
- II. The American Antitrust Enforcement Continuum
- III. Extraordinary Claims Without Extraordinary Evidence: Debunking the Myths of the Anti-tech Antitrust Agenda
- 1. The Evidence Does Not Support The Claim That Antitrust Enforcement As A Whole Has Failed
- 2. Concentration
- 3. Profits
- 4. Dynamism
- 5. Antitrust Enforcement
- 6. There Is No Basis For The Claim That Antitrust Enforcement Has Failed With The Technology Companies
- 7. Dominance Is Neither Conclusive Nor Clear
- 8. The “Head’s I Win, Tails You Lose” Attack on Tech Firms’ Unprofitability or Profitability Is Incoherent And Non-Empirical
- 9. Tech Company Acquisitions are not Directly Probative of Anything and Have Pro- as Well as Anticompetitive Potential
- IV. The Jury Is Very Much Still out on Antitrust Enforcement Today
- 1. Merger Enforcement Rates and Substance
- 2. Court Track Record
- 3. Proposed HSR Change and Draft Merger Guidelines
- 4. Other Changes
- V. Conclusion
- *
- *)Partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Washington, D.C.; previously served in senior positions at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission under two administrations, most recently as Director of the Bureau of Competition from 2017 – 2019
- **
- **)Associate at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York
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