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A Comparative Analysis of Art. 82 of the EC Treaty and Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act**
The European Commission is very soon expected to publish its long-awaited draft guidelines on Art. 82 EC Treaty. These draft guidelines will discuss controversial issues on the interpretation and application of the ban of abusing a dominant position. This article discusses the interpretation of Art. 82 EC Treaty in the light of the evolution of monopolization law under Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act in the US, and analysis the differences in analytical and judicial treatment of certain business conduct under both regimes.
Contents
- I. Introduction
- II. Policy Objectives in the EU and US
- 1. Art. 82 of the EC Treaty
- 2. Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act
- III. Law and Enforcement Practice in the EU and US
- 1. “Dominance” and “Monopoly Power”
- 1.1 The Basic Concepts in the EU and the US
- 1.2 Establishing Dominance and Monopoly Power
- 1.3 Collective Dominance in the EU
- 2. Identifying “Abusive” and “Anticompetitive” Conduct
- 2.1 The European Concept of Abuse
- 2.1.1 Exploitative Conduct
- 2.1.2 Exclusionary Conduct
- 2.1.3 The Role of Efficiencies
- 2.1.4 Consumer Harm
- 2.2 The US Concept of Anticompetitive Conduct
- IV. Determining Anticompetitive Conduct in Specific Contexts
- 1. Predatory Pricing
- 1.1 The EU Approach
- 1.2 The US Approach
- 1.3 Implications for a Test of Anticompetitive Conduct
- 2. Rebates/Bundled Discounts
- 2.1 The EU Approach
- 2.2 The US Approach
- 2.3 Implications for a Test of Anticompetitive Conduct
- 3. Refusals to Supply
- 3.1 The EU Approach
- 3.2 The US Approach
- 3.3 Implications for a Test of Anticompetitive Conduct
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- 4. Exclusive Dealing
- 4.1 The EU Approach
- 4.2 The US Approach
- 4.3 Implications for a Test of Anticompetitive Conduct
- 5. One Additional Test – the “Consumer Welfare” Test
- V. Conclusion and a Modest Proposal
- *
- *)Mr. Bloch is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, where he practices in the areas of antitrust litigation and counselling. Prior to joining Mayer, Brown, he was Chief, Professions and Intellectual Property Sec., Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice. Mr. Kamann is a partner in the Frankfurt/M. office of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP and his practice focuses on EC antitrust, state aid and regulation. Mr. Brown is an associate in the Washington, D.C., office of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, where he practices in the areas of antitrust counselling and litigation. Mr. Schmidt is an associate in the Brussels office of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP and his practice focuses on EC antitrust, state aid and regulation.
- **
- **)Mr. Bloch discussed parts of this paper at The International Bar Association 9th Annual Competition Conference, October 21 – 22, 2005, European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy.
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