ZWeR 2026, 1

RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH & Co. KG, Köln RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH & Co. KG, Köln 2199-1723 Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht ZWeR 2026 AufsätzeCaroline-Sophie Lehmkühler* / Sarah Steinseifer**

When Innovation Turns Anti-Competitive: A Comparative Legal Analysis of Google’s AI Overviews From a Competition Law Perspective

The rise of AI is not only an enrichment in many areas but also gives rise to new legal questions – competition law included. Since the introduction of so-called AI Overviews, which appear at the top of Google’s search results page, website operators have voiced concerns rooted in the fear of being entirely pushed out of the market. This has led to formal complaints submitted to competition authorities in both the U.S. and Europe. Whether Google’s use of AI Overviews constitutes a violation of U.S. and/or EU competition law is a complex issue, one that exemplifies how traditional legal reasoning must evolve to adequately assess the competitive impact of AI technologies. The aim of this paper is therefore to analyze the competition law issues arising in connection with the use of AI Overviews, both from the perspective of website operators and from that of operators of AI systems other than Google’s.

I. Introduction
II. How Google AI Overviews Work
III. Legal Assessment: AI Overviews as Violation of Antitrust Regulations?
- 1. Google’s Market Power
  - 1.1 Principles of Market Definition
  - 1.2 AI and Market Definition
    
    1.2.1 Market for General Search Services
    
    1.2.1.1 Why Google Will Dispute the Classification of AI Overviews as Part of the General Search Market
    
    1.2.1.2 AI Overviews as Add-on Feature to Google Search from the End Users’ Perspective
    
    1.2.1.3 AI-driven Developments in the General Search Market
    
    1.2.2 Online Publishing Markets
    
    1.2.2.1 Content Interchangeability from the End Users’ Perspective
    
    1.2.2.2 Google as Competitor of Website Operators: The Business Users’ Perspective
    
    1.2.3 Market for Generative AI-based Information Intermediaries
- 2. Violation of European Antitrust Law (Art. 102 TFEU)
  - 2.1 Copyright Infringement: Sign of Antitrust Law Violation?
    
    2.1.1 Short Analysis of Copyright Infringement Challenges and the AI Act’s Applicability
    
    2.1.2 Impact on the Application of Antitrust Law
  - 2.2 Exploitative Conduct
    
    2.2.1 Tying, Art. 102(d) TFEU
    
    2.2.2 Exploitative Abuse, Art. 102(a) TFEU
    
    2.2.2.1 General Considerations
    
    2.2.2.2 Google’s Conduct
    
    2.2.2.2.1 Solely Use of Google’s Own Content
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    2.2.2.2.2 Opt-out Models
    
    2.2.2.2.3 Reduction of Content in Overview and Compensation for Websites
  - 2.3 Exclusionary Conduct and Hybrid Forms of Abuse Involving Both Exclusionary and Exploitative Elements
    
    2.3.1 Discrimination, Art. 102(c) TFEU
    
    2.3.2 Essential Facilities Doctrine
    
    2.3.2.1 Prerequisites of the Essential Facilities Doctrine under European Case Law
    
    2.3.2.2 Access to Google Search as an Essential Facility
    
    2.3.2.2.1 Google Search as an Essential Facility?
    
    2.3.2.2.2 Limits of the Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Presence of Unreasonable Access Conditions
    
    2.3.2.3 Access to AI Overviews as an Essential Facility
    
    2.3.2.3.1 AI Overviews as an Essential Facility with Regard to Website Operators
    
    2.3.2.3.2 Essential Facilities Doctrine with Regard to Competing AI Systems
    
    2.3.3 Self-preferencing
    
    2.3.3.1 Self-preferencing in Relation to Google’s Competitors on Downstream Markets (and their Consumers)
    
    2.3.3.2 Self-preferencing in Relation to Website Operators
    
    2.3.3.2.1 Self-preferencing on Online Publishing Markets
    
    2.3.3.2.2 Self-preferencing of the Google Search Engine in Relation to Website Operators?
    
    2.3.4 Google’s Defense – Protection of Less Effective Competitors?
  - 2.4 Significance of Google’s Business Strategy and Interest in Innovation for Determining Abuse of Market Power
- 3. Google’s Conduct as a Violation of U.S. Antitrust Law – A website Operator’s Perspective
  - 3.1 Self-preferencing
  - 3.2 Leveraging of Monopoly Power
  - 3.3 Essential Facilities Doctrine
- 4. Google’s Conduct in Relation to AI Overviews as Prohibited Conduct under the DMA
  - 4.1 AI Overviews as Core Platform System
  - 4.2 Applicable Conduct Obligations
IV. Liability of AI Provider
V. Conclusion and Outlook

*: *)
Research Assistant and PhD Candidate at the Chair for Commercial and Business Law, University of Bonn (Prof. Dr. Daniel Zimmer LL.M. UCLA)
**: **)
Research Assistant and PhD Candidate at the Chair for Commercial and Business Law, University of Bonn (Prof. Dr. Daniel Zimmer LL.M. UCLA) and Visit Researcher at Harvard Law School

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